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BOOK REVIEWS
By J. Edward
Gerald. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. X, 184.
$29.95.
NEWS OF CRIME: COURTS AND PRESS IN CONFLICT.

Reviewed by David E. Kendall*
The "violent human-interest story,"" that is, the crime story,
has always been a great popular favorite: it is "news which appeals
to the average person as the most interesting and exciting in the
paper and on television."' In the past two decades, reporting on
crime and the criminal justice process has ensnarled the press in a
number of running battles with the courts. J. Edward Gerald's
News of Crime: Courts and Press in Conflict recounts some of
these conflicts. Gerald, who has taught journalism at a number of
different universities, 3 assays a short history of the controversies
over prejudicial pretrial publicity, gag orders, courtroom closures,
subpoenas to journalists, and cameras in the courtroom.
Professor Gerald's stated purpose in writing is "to help dispel
misconceptions based on irritation and anger and to encourage understanding between the courts and the press."'4 While his brief
book is refreshingly free of polemics and useful as a thumbnail history of recent struggles between the news media and the courts, it
is marred by a superficial approach that finesses or ignores many
of the most interesting questions. Gerald's premise, which clearly
emerges only in the last few pages of his book, is that the press
must become more institutionalized and speak with a more coher* Partner, Williams & Connolly, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1966, Wabash College; M.A.,
1968, Oxford University; J.D., 1971, Yale University.
1. J. GERALD, NEWS OF CRIME: COURTS AND PRESS IN CONFLICT 64 (1983).
2. Id.
3. Professor Gerald has taught journalism at the Universities of Missouri and Minnesota; has served as Visiting Teacher at the University of Texas, Indiana University, and the
University of Utah; and has been a Visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution. He has also
written THE PRESS AND THE CONSTrrUTION (1948), THE BRITISH PREss UNDER GOVERNMENT
ECONOMIC CONTROLS (1956), and SocIAL REsPoNsmirry OF THE PREss (1963).

4. J.

GERALD,

supra note 1, at 65.
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ent and unified voice if it is to protect its interests. His institutional model is apparently the American Bar Association,5 and he
is critical of the media's failure to organize such a "professional"
institution:
The task of developing an institutional position, of teaching it to others, and
of persuading them to respect it, is regarded as too burdensome. Yet this is
the heart of professional obligation and function. Without accepting this obligation, no profession can have the tools of destiny in its own hands.
Freedom, in order to be expressed in law and protected according to law,
must be defined. If it never gets beyond the emotional level it cannot take the
form of statute and constitutional decision. It can have neither positive nor
negative enforcement in court. Individuals who cannot codify their needs may
be doomed to feel frustrated rather than to write constitutions. The journalist, nevertheless, senses that the act of defining freedom means limiting it
and that impels him to stick with emotion and to avoid codes.8

This predilection helps explain some recurrent motifs in the book,
such as the author's recommendation of voluntary press-bar-judiciary councils as a means of resolving crime news disputes. Given the
cantankerous diversity of the American news media, however, a
prescription for organizational unity has all the utility of Will Rogers' solution to the German submarine menace in World War I:
"Boil the oceans-I'll let someone else handle the details." Exactly
because the process of "defining freedom means limiting it," many
journalists have eschewed any rigid codification of their obligation
to act "responsibly" and have avoided binding themselves to a professional body organized to act for them and to impose discipline
upon them. While Professor Gerald praises journalism's "idealists," he regrets their inability "to accept public responsibility for
professional standards" and "to take on the burden of professional
self-government." 7 Precisely what such a superstructure would en5. Gerald notes approvingly that the ABA
made several important gestures to the media, in an institutional sense, after it began
to study and write the [free press, fair trial] standards in 1966. The first, symbolized by
the invitation to leaders to present their arguments formally at the 1967 ABA convention in Hawaii, was to recognize the media as an institution organized with a representative leadership qualified to bargain for the whole. The record of contacts over the
years shows that law and journalism met in good order on their differences and that
constructive negotiation resulted.
Id. at 168. Gerald does not specify who these media "leaders" were or how the ABA selected them. Nor does he describe how this "representative leadership" was authorized or
qualified to "bargain for the whole."
6. Id. at 184.
7. Id. at 183. Gerald asserts that "[t]he way to maximize freedom, as journalists well
know, is to organize for its development and protection. But the ideal of journalism, as yet,
is not freedom under law but freedom." Id. Gerald does not identify these "idealists" or
"absolutists," id. at 182, but he earlier describes Washington Post Managing Editor Howard
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tail, however, is difficult to envision. Regrettably Professor Gerald
waits until the last paragraphs of his book to set forth these views,
for their effective implementation would surely have radical implications for the profession of journalism.
The style of the book is surprisingly leaden. With a journalist,
not a lawyer, writing about as vivid a subject as reporting crime,
the unwary reader is nevertheless mugged by such opaque
sentences as, "[i]nstitutions are supplanting individuals in the social process and more and more are demanding the civil rights conceived of originally for the protection and development of individual persons alone";' "[1]ike a cry for freedom to publish, the
tradition of fair trial arose in countless encounters between individuals and the law over the past millenium"; 9 and "[t]he events in
which Farr was caught up, the Charles Manson cult murders, seem
a fantasy from a world in which the legislatures undertook to undermine the authority of the courts."'10
With some notable exceptions, such as Gerald's discussion of
the Nebraska murders that led to the Supreme Court's Nebraska
Press" decision, his discussion of cases is simply too abbreviated
to be particularly helpful in understanding the nuances involved
when the courts and the press are at loggerheads. Too often, as in
his discussion of the Corona case,' 2 Gerald is so careless with chronology and sloppy with procedural details that a reader finds it
impossible to follow the sequence of events. Far more helpful and
interesting than Gerald's two-paragraph precis of a complicated
case are his more detailed discussions of legal or ethical dilemmas
confronting a reporter. Should the name of a rape victim be published? If the police arrest a prostitute who has a list in her possession containing names of well-known business and political figures,
should the names on the list be broadcast? Under what circumstances should a suspect's prior criminal record be reported? What
circumstances should prompt a reporter to mention a suppressed
confession or illegally seized evidence that was excluded from
trial? How should the press accurately and fairly report plea barSimons as an advocate of the position that "the journalist knows society's needs as well as
judges and should not be compelled to subordinate his judgment to other imperatives." Id.
at 19.
8. Id. at 174.
9. Id. at 45.
10. Id. at 134.
11. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
12. Corona v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. App. 3d 872, 101 Cal. Rpt. 411 (1972); J. GinALD, supra note 1 at 68-70.
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gaining which is responsible for disposing of about ninety percent
of criminal charges? What ethical rules should govern reporters'
use of confidential sources in criminal cases? The most interesting
passages of Gerald's book wrestle with one of these particular
problems in a concrete setting.13 Unfortunately, Gerald too frequently opts for a bird's-eye view of these controversial areas without teasing out and analyzing the particular competing claims involved in a given case.
The first hundred pages of the book trace the tension between
writing freely about criminal trials and providing the accused with
a fair and impartial jury. After briefly describing a landmark contempt case of the early 1940's, 14 Gerald provides a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's 1966 decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell 15 and then shows how the ABA Trial Standards evolved in
reaction to Sheppard. In the Sheppard trial, the judge totally abnegated his duty to control events in his courtroom. The trial was
a media circus in which "[t]he journalists took part as advocates in
the entire criminal process ....
Legal standards were put to one
side in the enthusiastic effort to send Sheppard to prison."'' Thus,
the Supreme Court held that journalistic disturbance "inspired by
the police, prosecutor, and coroner denied Sheppard a fair trial.' 1
In response to Sheppard, the bar and the judiciary greatly overreacted to the possibility of prejudicial publicity, as many subsequent criminal cases clearly demonstrate. While the courts some13. See, e.g., J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 90-91
14. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). Gerald does not mention a number of
important Supreme Court cases following Bridges and preceding Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333 (1966) that addressed the question of what a newspaper could write about court
proceedings. See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
331 (1946); see also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
15. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Although he discusses the case later, Gerald ignores in this
context Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), an extremely important due process case that
was a forerunner of Sheppard.
16. J. GFRALD, supra note 1, at 26. Gerald points out that most of the reporters covering the trial seemed to join in the prosecution's effort to convict Sheppard. Newspapers
editorially demanded Sheppard's arrest and published lurid details of one of the doctor's
extramarital affairs, long since over. The media systemically reported police charges according to a double standard. The police standard permitted individual investigators to float lies and fanciful fabrications which
were presented in the media as fact. At one point, a front page picture of Mrs. Sheppard's blood stained pillow was published after being retouched to show the alleged
imprint of a surgical instrument-inferentially her husband's. The cruel hoaxes or
myths never got on the trial record because there was little or no truth in them. But
the police and the newspapers helped get them into the minds of the community.
Id.
17. Id. at 28.
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times employed traditional remedies to combat the prejudice of a
hostile community, such as change of venue, continuance, an extensive voir dire, severance, additional peremptories, admonishment of jurors, and sequestration, the gag order became a favored
device. In the 1976 landmark decision Nebraska Press Association
5 however, the Court rejected the gag order and took the
v. Stuart,"
opportunity to emphasize the range of available remedies that do
not directly impinge upon the right of the press to report information in its possession. As Gerald points out, "big publicity cases do
not occur often";' 9 hence no need exists to distort the first amendment and the normal rules of criminal procedure to accommodate
the occasional, extraordinarily well-publicized case. Of course, massive publicity inevitably will ensue when a presidential assassin is
himself assassinated or when a crime spree erupts leaving a number of corpses in its wake. The widespread reporting of such events
is inevitable and desirable insofar as the community is then more
accurately informed and the public dangers defined and clarified.
Moreover, widescale publicity is not necessarily the same as prejudicial publicity. The legal test for the exclusion of jurors has never
been mere knowledge of a crime, but rather the kind of indelible
preconceptions that are impossible to renounce.20 Gerald describes
in detail the procedures followed by Judge Jack B. Weinstein in
the United States v. Pfingst case 1 and documents how a vigilant
18. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Court unanimously voted to reverse the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision, but only five Justices joined the Chief Justice's opinion for the
Court.
19. J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 74. Chief Justice Burger has commented that" '[i]n an
overwhelming majority of criminal trials, pretrial publicity presents few unmanageable
threats to [the] important right [of fair trial]."' Id. (quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 551 (1976)).
20. In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798 (1975), the Court declined to rule as a
matter of due process that "persons who have learned from news sources of a defendant's
prior criminal record are presumed to be prejudiced." The Court held that "[q]ualified jurors need not ... be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved [so long as] . . . 'the
juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence
presented in court.'" Id. at 799-800 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). Although Gerald mentions the Murphy decision, J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 72-73, he evinces
no awareness of how difficult it is since Murphy, for a defendant to gain a new trial because
of juror prejudice or bias that is demonstrated on voir dire. While the Supreme Court did
not overrule Irvin or Sheppard, it sharply limited them to situations "where the general
atmosphere in the community or courtroom is sufficiently inflammatory." 421 U.S. at 802.
The "sky-is-falling" kind of outcry that prosecutors and judges occasionally raise concerning
the possibility that newspaper publicity will cause a reversal on appeal is, to say the least,
usually very ill-founded.
21. J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 82 (discussing United States v. Pfingst, 477 F.2d 177
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 941 (1973)).
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and careful judge can successfully conduct the trial of a highly visible judicial corruption case without infringing the rights of either
the defendant or the press. Clearly, gag orders normally result
from the mismanagement of a judicial assignment and, more often
22
than not, are conceived in unreality and destined for futility.
Gerald then traces the reaction of the lower courts to the Nebraska Press decision, pointing out how the rejection of the gag
order led courts to regulate their own processes more closely, both
by orders preventing attorneys and court personnel from talking to
the press and by orders closing court proceedings. The battleground today is over access to these closed hearings, and here, unfortunately, Gerald proves a less than reliable guide. In large part,
Gerald is not to blame because the Supreme Court's access decisions of the past five years have been contradictory and confusing.
Gerald attempts to reconcile the Gannett' and Richmond Newspapers24 decisions and to derive a unified and rational principle
from them. In one sense, Gerald accurately states that "[t]he difference between them is that the Court says a hearing is not a trial
and may be closed for reasons somewhat less substantial than
those required to close a trial."2 5 But the holdings cannot be so
easily rationalized, and the Court's later decision in the Boston
Globe case,26 which Gerald barely notes, clearly shows that the
controversial 5-4 Gannett decision was simply a misstep and an
aberration. Gerald's failure to distinguish clearly between the
Court's sixth amendment "public trial" focus in Gannett and its
first amendment focus in Richmond Newspapers and Boston
Globe makes his summary discussion of the positions of the various Justices in the two cases impossible to understand. This failure
also obscures the fundamental transformation wrought by Richmond Newspapers, a case that did not simply "[bring] First
22. Gerald observes that in the Nebraska Press case itself, the prejudicial facts that
the local judge sought to suppress already had circulated in the community:
When the county court judge, Ronald Ruff, issued his gag order to the journalists
on October 22, [1975,] in preparation for the hearing the next day, he was trying to
wipe out the news that had already been published and to roll back human minds in
Lincoln County to the point where Simants could be regarded as innocent until the
cumbersome legal system got around to giving him a trial. In doing so, he sought to
follow legal standards mired in the mud of unreality.
J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 97.
23. Gannett Co., v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
24. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
25. J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 105.
26. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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Amendment openness back in good order,

' 27

but also recognized

an important new access right that appears inconsistent with the
Court's earlier niggardly protections afforded journalists' efforts to
gather information. 2 Gannett and Richmond Newspapers are con-

sistent only in the most myopic and technical sense: their fundamental thrust is different, with the more sweeping first amendment
analysis of the latter case plainly destined to swallow up the former's emphasis on an individual defendant's right to regulate
courtroom access.
Gerald offers a number of scattered, but useful, insights about
the voir dire process, which is emerging as one of the most important safeguards of an impartial trial. Although critics have described it as too often "stilted, hurried, and routine,"2 9 in analyzing
a number of high publicity trials Gerald demonstrates how a careful and comprehensive voir dire can reduce the risk of biased jury
decisionmaking. These descriptions are helpful because they emphasize that an impartial jury is not necessarily an ignorant jury.
In some cases, such as Irvin v. Dowd,30 however, the voir dire
reveals that unfavorable publicity about the accused has so saturated the community that prejudices cannot effectively be put out
of jurors' minds. The difficulty in these cases, as Gerald recognizes,
is the dearth of empirical studies of the relationship between what
jurors say on voir dire and how they act during the actual verdict
process.
Despite its defects, voir dire remains a critical safeguard for
the criminal defendant, given the first amendment implications of
certain other remedies. Thus, recent dicta in a Supreme Court
opinion that appeared shortly after publication of the Gerald book
are simply incomprehensible. In Press-EnterpriseCompany v. Superior Court"1 the Court considered a voir dire process in a capital
trial for the rape and murder of a teenage girl. The process had
27.

J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 107.

28. In earlier opinions the Court had taken the view that "[t]he Constitution does not
...require government to accord the press special access to information not shared by
members of the public generally." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (footnote omitted). See also Houchins, Sheriff v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978) (opinion of Chief
Justice Burger, for the Court); Saxbe, Attorney General v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843, 850 (1974).
29.

J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 78.

30. 366 U.S. 717 (1961). But see Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975) (no presumption that persons learning of defendant's criminal record from news reports are prejudiced
against him); supra note 20.
31. 52 U.S.L.W. 4113 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1984).
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consumed six weeks, all but three days of which had been closed to
the public. Following the first amendment analysis of Richmond
Newspapers and Boston Globe, the Court held unanimously that
openness enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and
the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the
system: "[T]he presumption of openness may be overcome only by
an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."'3 2 The Chief Justice's opinion, joined by seven other Justices,
contained a footnote criticizing the length and conduct of the voir
dire:
We cannot fail to observe that a voir dire process of such length, in and of
itself undermines public confidence in the courts and the legal profession.
The process is to ensure a fair impartial jury, not a favorable one. Judges, not
advocates, must control that process to make sure privileges are not so
abused. Properly conducted it is inconceivable that the process could extend
over such a period. We note, however, that in response to questions counsel
stated that 3it3 is not unknown in California courts for jury selection to extend
six months.

Mr. Justice Marshall blasted this gratuitous comment in a
concurring opinion, noting that obtaining a fair and impartial jury
might well require such a lengthy voir dire:
After all, this was a capital case involving an interracial sexual attack
that was bound to arouse a heightened emotional response from the affected
community. In a situation of this sort, the public's response to the use of
unusually elaborate procedures to protect the rights of the accused might well
be, not lessened confidence in the courts, but rather heightened respect for
the judiciary's unshakeable commitment to the3 ideal of due process even for
persons accused of the most serious of crimes. '

As Gerald recognizes - but as the Press-EnterpriseCourt apparently did not - the trade-offs necessary to protect first amendment rights are not cost-free. Forgoing the administratively simple
remedies of closure and gag orders will almost certainly entail
greater judicial expenditures of time and money for voir dire,
change of venue, sequestration, 5 and, in exceptional cases, retrial.
32. Id. at 4115-16.
33. Id. at 4116 n.9.
34. Id. at 4119 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). See, e.g., Babcock, Voir Dire:
preserving 'Its Wonderful Power,' 27 STAN L. REV. 545 (1975). Babcock contends that limits

on the voir dire examination undercut the ability of the litigant to exercise his peremptory
challenges that are essential to the jury trial right and also may implicate the equal protection clause.
35. Gerald points out one of the little-appreciated consequences of sequestration: "Sequestration means that persons of professional status or business responsibility usually cannot give time to jury duty." J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 81. Trial lawyers have long been
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Gerald's analysis of the problems that arise when journalists
rely on sources which they have promised not to disclose is muddled and misleading. He begins by positing what is surely an inaccurate formulation of the reporter's dilemma: "[I]n order to get to
the news, the journalist is driven to assert an ethical position
which is essentially contradictory. He asks the public to trust him
but he cannot or will not offer proof."3 Nothing is really "contradictory" about the position of the journalist who must rely on confidential sources for a portion of what he or she reports. The reporter is essentially saying, "I am doing the best I can - here is
what I can tell you," and any "trust" that arises springs from the
general credibility of the reporter and the reporter's account. The
reporter is certainly offering "proof", but it is proof that may be
more difficult to assess and that may be credible only in the context of a carefully reported story which contains other precisely
described and documented information. Gerald writes:
Trouble arises when investigative reporters question witnesses, make voice
records of conversations while in search of incriminating admissions, and insist at the same time upon immunity against subpoenas to testify. Reporters
obtain secret witnesses who, in fear, ask for state protection. They accept and
disseminate leaks from lawyers who, in a specific case, are under silence orders designed to protect petit juries. These events, contradictory in motive
and consequence, are the heart of the court-press conflict, for the courts are
required to exclude information not qualifying as evidence. The media, in
effect, follow a law of their own: that the First Amendment gives them authority to tell the public everything. They argue that the public has a right to
know about accusations and that it can judge whether prosecutions should
follow. There is not much concern about apparent conflict between ethics and
law. 3

This passage is puzzling, insofar as it suggests that in the usual
case the reporter is doing something to affirmatively endanger the
legal process. Precious few witnesses have ever "ask[ed] for state
protection" because of knowledge possessed by reporters. In the
usual case the reporter, by dint of an industrious investigation, has
discovered facts about crime or corruption and has published a
story based upon those facts. Even if the reporter is "follow[ing] a
law of [his] own," his actions are precisely what the first amendment countenances, and it is very difficult to find any conflict between "ethics and law" apart from the journalist's insistence that
aware that sequestration inevitably results in selection of a different class of jurors, leading
to a jury which is more rootless, less affluent, and possessing fewer human attachments than
the average cross-section of the community.
36. J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 118.
37. Id. at 127.
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he or she not violate pledges of confidentiality.
Throughout his discussion of the shield law question," Gerald
mischaracterizes the nature of the journalists' claims and the factual contexts in which they normally arise. For example, referring
to the grand jury as "an old and seldom criticized law enforcement
institution,"3 9 is hardly accurate, in view of the massive abuses of
grand jury power that have been documented over the last few decades. 40 As often as not, grand juries in well-publicized cases have
served to stifle dissent and to cover up official corruption. While
Gerald discusses the three cases that led to the Supreme Court's
closely divided 1972 ruling in Branzburg v. Hayes,41 he asserts that
"[t]he Branzburg case went to the Supreme Court at a time when
journalists not only were resisting grand jury subpoenas, but were
writing stories based on grand jury proceedings, that is official papers which, by law, could not be released until a judge had edited
them for public use.' 4 2 While stories based on grand jury leaks' 3
have been grist for the judicial mill from time immemorial, no
surge in the number of such stories occurred in the late 1960's and
early 1970's. The litigation that led to the Branzburg decision concerned something quite different; only by understanding this litigation are the later shield laws and the post-Branzburg cases
comprehensible.
The pre-Branzburglitigation typically concerned an enterprising and energetic reporter who uncovered some kind of official corruption or actually witnessed something that a prosecutor might
deem criminal conduct. When subpoenaed to testify before a grand
jury, the journalist's position was that the first amendment afforded newsgathering at least a qualified protection, lest confidential informants be deterred from talking to the press and the flow
38. A "shield law" refers to the limited privilege that half of the states have granted to
journalists to permit them not to identify their sources. See J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 115150.
39. Id. at 129.
40. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL & G. NAFrAms, THE GRAND JuRY: AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL
18-42, 52-116 (1977).
41. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court adjudicated three cases:
Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266
N.E.2d 297 (1971), and Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971).
42. J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 129.
43. Many kinds of grand jury "leaks" are not illegal or unethical in any way. While
prosecutors and grand jurors are bound to keep secret what transpires in the grand jury
room, witnesses are not; they are free to relate the interrogation they have undergone. Savvy
journalists, as well as criminal defense lawyers, often may be able to track accurately the
course of a grand jury investigation by debriefing grand jury witnesses.
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of news to the public therefore be constricted. This position is
4
hardly a claim, as Gerald phrases it, to "operate outside the law."
Insofar as the journalist discovered acts of crime or corruption, she
called these acts to the community's attention, and the criminal
justice system, with its far greater investigative resources, then was
able to address the problem. All too often, however, the grand
jury's way of addressing the problem was to address a subpoena to
the reporter. The reporter's resultant claim of privilege does not
differ materially from that of an attorney, asked by a grand jury
about his client's statements; a priest, asked about statements
made to him in the confessional; or any grand jury witness, asked
to make a statement under oath that might incriminate the witness. Of course, the Court rejected the journalist's claim in
Branzburg,but Gerald neglects to probe the question-begging logic
of the Court's emphasis on the rule that "'the public . . . has a
right to every man's evidence,' ,,45 on which the Supreme Court
purportedly based its Branzburg holding.
Gerald, therefore, fails to appreciate the manner in which the
shield laws-which the states enacted after Branzburg-were perfectly consistent with the development of other well-recognized exceptions to the testimonial obligation. Although he notes some of
46
the decisions that recognized qualified claims of confidentiality,
he misses entirely the remarkable efflorescence of lower court deci4 7
and afsions that focus on the Powell concurrence in Branzburg
ford journalists in non-grand jury situations exactly the kind of
qualified first amendment privilege they had sought in
Branzburg.48 Gerald ends his discussion with a conclusion that
44.
45.

J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 149.
408 U.S. at 688 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).

46. J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 146 (discussing United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d
139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981)).
47. A fact often overlooked is that while Justice Powell wrote separately in Branzburg,
he joined Justice White's opinion for the Court, making that a majority opinion. 408 U.S. at
665.
48. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d
433 (10th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 52 U.S.L.W. 4043 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1984); Baker v.
F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973). Gerald
briefly describes some of the more famous cases since Branzburg-those involving William
Farr, Myron Farber, and the "Fresno Four"-in which journalists have gone to jail rather
than reveal confidential sources. See J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 134-41. Gerald, however,
presents the facts in choppy and confusing form: frequently the reader has difficulty divining the exact procedural sequences of the case from Gerald's narrative, which provides no
summary evaluation. With respect to Farr, in particular, a number of questions arise concerning the propriety of what he did and of the ways in which his case is or is not represen-
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merits quoting at length because it is representative of the style of

the book:
This chapter has recounted the efforts of journalists to obtain as much elbow
room under law as they could and has noted the consequences. The major
episode was a decision of the United States Supreme Court (Branzburg v.
Hayes) placing rather clear limits on the scope of special testamentary privilege. It became clear, under that reasoning, that while journalists had much
freedom to gather and write news, they also were subject to regulation in the
public interest-not as public utilities, but as the carriers of information and
opinion upon which society must depend for the formulation of policy. Moreover, once the major policy decision was made, the U.S. circuit court majorities facilitated rather than impaired journalism's watchdog role. Regrettably,
from journalism's viewpoint, this kind of facilitation limits the absolutist version of freedom of speech and press, and it requires the individual writer and
editor to confront his own motives and to respect his professional work standards in order to avoid retribution defined by law. This risk of retribution is
imbedded in two lines of cases, one shielding the journalist against revealing
his or her sources of information when asked to testify in court, and the other
subjecting him, under court rules that define the limits of privilege, to intensive interrogation about his standards of work and the motives which energized his treatment of the subject. While the pilgrimage to today's definitions
of freedom has not been completed without journalistic martyrs, and a treasure in litigation
costs, the facts reviewed do not show major shifts in freedom
49
of the press.

The problems with this summary are manifold. Even the most absolute of first amendment "idealists" could hardly call the
Branzburg decision one that subjected the press to "regulation in
the public interest." Further, the court of appeals decisions that
have followed Branzburg have largely turned their back on the majority opinion and have afforded journalists the very qualified privilege espoused by the Stewart dissent. Finally, simply as a matter
of style, it is unclear how the "risk of retribution" is "imbedded"
in two lines of cases when under one line the journalist may actually protect his or her sources. Too often, this verbal fogginess sets
in during Gerald's analysis of the difficult dilemmas that he
addresses.
The chapter on photographing criminal trials is a somewhat
self-contained survey of the entry, exit, and return of courtroom
cameras. Gerald traces how the excesses of the Hauptmann and
Sheppard trials, and perhaps the Ruby trial, apparently inspired
the Supreme Court's remarkably sweeping opinion in Estes v.
Texas.50 The Estes trial, as Gerald makes clear, was not a particularly sensationalized one. Television covered portions of the trial,
tative. Gerald addresses none of these questions.
49. J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 149-50.
50.

381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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and although television equipment was plainly visible in the courtroom, the broadcasting did not disrupt the trial. "The Estes lawyers, having few facts with which to defend their client, claimed he
was deprived of due process by the televising and broadcasting of

his trial

....

'

The Supreme Court agreed. Chief Justice Warren

"-51

sought an unequivocal majority to ban television forever from the
courtroom under the sixth and fourteenth amendments, but Justice Clark finally wrote an opinion for the Court that was only
slightly more moderate: "With hardly a citation to fact in it, but in
indignation and fear, he found cameras a threat. His opinion was
not factually proved, but awesomely conjectural. ' 52 The Estes decision retarded but did not stifle the use of television in the courtroom, and a number of states experimented with various forms of
53
the Supreme Court apcoverage. Finally, in Chandler v. Florida,
proved the televising of a criminal trial under strict court guidelines over the defendant's objection.
Gerald describes, but makes no real attempt to explain, the
vehemence of the opposition of some judges and lawyers to televising court proceedings. The educational value of such coverage is
enormous, and the malign influence of the television camera on judicial proceedings is almost entirely speculative. With the miniaturization of the broadcasting equipment and reasonable rules to
preserve courtroom decorum, no valid reason exists for not allowing the television camera to substitute for the citizen in attendance during a trial. Despite the ABA's 1982 approval of cameras in
the courtroom under carefully prescribed conditions, however, the
opposition to television experiments is often hydrophobic. For example, the Virginia State Senate recently defeated a bill to allow
television cameras in selected courtrooms during a two-year experiment, with individual senators asserting that the experiment would
"violate the sanctity of the courtroom," transform trial lawyers
into "more Virginia hams than we've got in Smithfield," and un4
fairly distort the events of trial.
"Judges and journalists alike interpret the Constitution," 55 ob51.
the flair
52.
53.

J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 158. "The only thing sensational about the facts was
which Estes had for swindling his friends and neighbors." Id.
Id. at 159.
449 U.S. 560 (1981).

54. The Virginia Senate Majority Leader is quoted as saying, "What's going to be on
the media? It will be only a 20-second or 30-second clip of what goes on. That is all." Washington Post, Mar. 3, 1984, at 1, col. 2.

55. J.

GERALD,

supra note 1, at 88.
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serves Gerald, but "journalists lack the power to put people in
jail." 56 Judicial fiat, however, will not easily govern the long-standing love-hate relationship between journalism and the criminal
courts. Events of the past decade have proven that a judicial ukase
flatly inconsistent with the traditional practice of journalism is not
likely to control the press. The Court has not overruled enfeebled
precedents like Branzburg and Gannett; and they are still on the
books, "[lying] about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of
any authority. ' 57 But protections have slowly evolved through the
judicial process, enabling the press to better fulfill its vitally important role of bringing the news of crime, criminals, and courts to
the public.

56.
57.

Id. at 89.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson J., dissenting).

3 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW: THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT. By Earl
W. Kintner and Professor Joseph P. Bauer. Cincinnati, Ohio: Anderson Publishing Co., 1983. Pp. xvii, 748.
Reviewed by Glen E. Weston*
The treatise Federal Antitrust Law' is a significant contribution to antitrust law. Four volumes out of a projected eight volume
project now have been published,2 and the high quality of these
three indicates that the end result will be a comprehensive treatise
that is both an important pragmatic research source and an influential guide for understanding antitrust policy. The chief author,
Earl W. Kintner, has distinguished himself as an antitrust and
trade regulation expert s who has brought enormous energy, intelligence, imagination, and organizational skill to each of the many
projects he has undertaken. One of the most significant of these
projects was the organization within his law firm of a publication
group that has rendered important service to the profession and
public by producing an excellent series of texts on antitrust and
trade regulation, 4 an exhaustive compilation of the legislative history of the antitrust laws, 5 and now the first volumes of this extensive treatise. Mr. Kintner's co-author of Volume 3 of the treatise,
Joseph P. Bauer of the University of Notre Dame Law School, is a
* S. Chesterfield Oppenheim Professor of Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law, George
Washington University National Law Center. B.S., 1943, University of Maryland; J.D., 1948,
George Washington University National Law Center; Co-editor with S. OPPENHEIM, THE
LAWYER'S ROBINSON-PATmAN ACT SOURCEBOOK (4 Vols. 1971).
1. 1 & 2 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW (1980); 3
ERAL ANTITRUST LAW (1983).

E.

KINTNER

& J. BAUER,

FED-

2. Volumes 1 and 2, dealing with the Sherman Act, were published in 1980. Volume 3,
dealing with the Robinson-Patman Act, was published in 1983. Volumes 4 and 5 deal with
the Clayton Act; Volume 4 was published, and Volume 5 is scheduled to be published, in
1984.
3. Among other positions, Mr. Kintner served as Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission from 1959 to 1961, after spending six years as General Counsel to the Commission.
He is presently a senior partner with the Washington, D.C., law firm of Arent, Fox, Kintner,
Plotkin & Kahn.
4. See E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER (2d ed. 1982);
KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER (2d ed. 1979); E. KINTNER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW
OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES (2d ed. 1978); E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER (1974); E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER (2d ed. 1973); E. KINTNER, PRIMER
ON THE LAW OF MERGERS (1973).
5. E. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES (7 vols. 1978-1983).

E.
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leading teacher of antitrust and trade regulation law. Professor
Bauer has written numerous highly regarded articles, particularly
on the Clayton Act's merger and tie-in provisions and on refusals
to deal.'
In 1980 Mr. Kintner published Volumes 1 and 2 of Federal
Antitrust Law. Volume 1 provides a background of economic theory, a careful exegesis of development of the common law and legislative history of the Sherman Act,7 full analyses of the constitutionality of the Sherman Act and of the frequently troublesome
issues surrounding the Act's interstate or foreign commerce requirement, and a lucid explication of the basic "Rule of Reason"
standard of the Sherman Act. Those readers who are not well
versed in antitrust will find this volume of immense value because
it provides an excellent background for understanding the basic
nature and purpose of antitrust. It is written quite objectively and
with admirable balance. It interweaves comments by and references to both writers who are associated with the so-called
"Harvard" or "structuralist" school of antitrust economics and
those scholars commonly regarded as adherents to the "Chicago
School" of antitrust economics, 8 apparently regarding their differing viewpoints as peripheral when placed in the overall perspective
of antitrust law and policy. While justification for this point of
view exists-there are no monolithic "schools" of economists-this
reviewer would prefer to see more focus upon the differences between the approaches of those writers usually identified with one
group or the other. Volume 2 is a detailed and carefully written
exposition of how sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act pertain to a
wide range of agreements and practices. In short, it is a very pragmatic guide to the application of the Act to specific practices.
Volume 3 of the treatise, the focus of this Book Review, is a
detailed text on the Robinson-Patman Amendment to section 2 of
the Clayton Act," which regulates price discrimination and discriminatory advertising and promotional plans by interstate sellers of
commodities. Volume 3 is of particular significance to the antitrust
6. See Bauer, Government Enforcement Policy of Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Carte
Blanche for Conglomerate Mergers?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 348 (1983); Bauer, A Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 33 VAND. L. Rxv. 283
(1980); Bauer, PerSe Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 685 (1979).

7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
8. For a discussion of these two approaches, see S.
CARTHY, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS

9 n.13 (4th ed. 1981).

9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982).
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bar and to corporate counsel because no definitive text on the
Robinson-Patman Act has appeared in the more than twenty years
since the publication of Frederick W. Rowe's classic 1962 treatise,"
which is now out-of-print. While one could not expect Volume 3 of
Federal Antitrust Law to match fully the incredible depth of analysis of the Rowe work, the Rowe text is outdated as a result of the
enormous changes in enforcement policies, economic theories, and
judicial interpretation that have occurred over the past two decades. For the past several years this reviewer has been recommending to lawyers as well as to students, Kintner's Robinson-Patman Act Primer" as the best general text on the Act, although
that book's limited objectives and short length necessarily affected
its utility. Volume 3 of FederalAntitrust Law now meets the critical need for a high-quality, comprehensive text on this most complex of all antitrust statutory provisions.
This volume skillfully combines an excellent introduction and
overview of the Robinson-Patman Act with a detailed exploration
of the murky depths of this "singularly opaque and elusive stat12
ute," as the late Justice Harlan once characterized it.
The book

is, thus, exceptional because it is well-suited to the needs of the
newcomer to the price discrimination law, while also serving many
of the more exacting requirements of those who already are sophisticated in the intricacies of the Act. The beginning chapters, which
introduce the Clayton Act and discuss the background and legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Amendment, provide an understanding of the economic crisis and social and political conditions that spawned the statute. The chapter on jurisdictional
requirements for a section 2(a) violation is a thorough, but concise,
analysis of the many specific elements that must be present before
price differentials fall within the reach of this complex prohibition.
These jurisdictional requirements have been a fertile source of litigation, prompting the perceptive comment by an astute British observer that "[n]o statute better demonstrates the legislative folly of
trying to define 'sin' in detail."' 13 Lawyers endeavoring to advise
clients on whether particular pricing systems comply with the Act,
or on whether their clients may have causes of action for treble
damages, can find valuable assistance in this careful exploration of
10.

F.

11. E.
12.

ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN

KINTNER,

A

ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER

ACT

(1962).

(2d ed. 1979).

FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 530 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

13. D.

GOYDER & A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

468 (2d ed. 1970).
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the judicial interpretation of each requirement.
The experienced antitrust lawyer will derive substantial benefit from the discussion of several of the most troublesome problems
of the Robinson-Patman Act. Foremost among these issues is the
application of the statute to "functional discounts"-for example,
a wholesaler's or retailer's discount14-and to "dual distribution"-a seller's practice of using differing marketing channels for
distribution of goods.15 The Act presents sellers using these common distribution systems with horrendous, insoluble problems of
compliance with hopelessly conflicting judicial decisions 6 and several differences of opinion between the FTC and the Department
of Justice. 17 Kintner and Bauer offer no magical solution to these
dilemmas, but they do provide a very worthwhile analysis of the
application of the Act to a variety of common "dual distribution"
situations and an excellent discussion of some of the differing theories and suggested arguments for handling these difficult problems.
Among other important areas of great complexity in which
both the expert and novice will find substantial assistance from the
book, the following are noteworthy: Issues of "standing to sue" for
treble damages for violations of the Act; the kinds of "services or
facilities" that sections 2(d) and 2(e) cover;' 8 and the vagaries of
the "meeting competition" defense, with which the FTC for many
years attempted to impose numerous limitations in a seriatim
"Catch 22" fashion. The first of these-"standing to sue"-is of
paramount importance at present because of a near moratorium on
government enforcement, which makes private treble damage ac14. 3 E. KINTNER & J. BAUER, supra note 1, at § 22.14.
15. Id. For example, dual distribution occurs when a manufacturer sells directly to
some ultimate users through company owned retail stores and also sells to independent
wholesalers, independent retailers, or both. Id.
16. See Purolator Products, Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1045 (1968); Mueller Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
923 (1964); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds,
340 U.S. 231 (1951). See also In re Boise Cascade Corp., 97 F.T.C. 199, 246 (1981); FLM
Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1097 (1977); Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.Y. 1960);
Secatore's, Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 171 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1959).
17. See Memorandum for United States as amicus curiae in support of petition for
certiorari,Purolator Products, Inc. v. FTC, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968), denying cert. to 352 F.2d
874 (7th Cir. 1965), reprintedin part, 1 S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, THE LAWYER'S ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT SOURCEBOoK 819-21 (1971); Memorandum for United States as amicus curiae in opposition to petition for certioriari,Monroe Auto Equipment Co. v. FTC, 382 U.S.
1009 (1966), denying cert. to 347 F.2d 401 (1965), reprinted in part, 1 S. OPPENHE M & G.
WESTON, THE LAWYER'S ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT SOURCEBOOK, 849-51 (1971).

18.

15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d)-13(e) (1982).
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tions the principal enforcement mechanism. As a result, the major
thrust of client counselling must be the avoidance or minimization
of exposure to potential treble damage claims.
The authors' treatment of "first-line" or seller level competitive injury evokes a mild dissent by this reviewer. The authors apparently adhere to what may be called the "traditional" view, supported by a long line of FTC and court decisions, 19 of the
competitive injury requirement in geographic price discrimination
cases. These cases permit a finding of competitive injury without
requiring clear proof that the lower prices were below "cost," according to an objective standard of "cost." In this reviewer's opinion, recent economic theory and empirical studies have established
the need to use objective standards in identifying "predatory pricing" in order to safeguard adequately consumers' interests in vigorous price competition. Professors Areeda and Turner of Harvard
Law School, beginning in a landmark 1975 law review article, have
presented brilliant arguments for such a standard.2 0 Their articles
have influenced greatly the lower federal courts in their interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act, as well as the Sherman Act, in
first-line injury cases.' Although Kintner and Bauer make substantial references to the Areeda-Turner theories and to some judicial opinions relying upon these views, Volume 3's discussion is too
concise to suit this reviewer. It apparently reflects the authors'
viewpoint that the Supreme Court is not likely to adopt the
Areeda-Turner approach. In this reviewer's opinion, however, the
Court is likely to adopt a variant of the Areeda-Turner view, currently prevailing in lower federal court decisions, that pricing
above "average variable cost" is at least presumptively "non-predatory" and, therefore, valid in first-line injury cases.
In summary, the Kintner-Bauer Volume is now the leading
Robinson-Patman text. It is concise and clear and, at the same
time, sufficiently detailed, thorough, and scholarly to meet the diverse requirements of a wide range of users. It is the one book
19. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); Moore v.
Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
20. Areeda & Turner, PredatoryPricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). See also Areeda & Turner, Williamson on
PredatoryPricing,87 YA L.J. 1337 (1978); Areeda & Turner, Scherer on PredatoryPricing: A Reply, 89 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1976).
21. See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 698
F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 370 (1983); 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp.,
659 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Northeastern Tel. Co. v.
American Tel. & TeL Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
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available that best fills the critical need for an up-to-date and detailed coverage of this important and complex federal statute regulating price and service discrimination. A good law library would
be incomplete without it.

